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ABSTRACT
Thanks to the foresight of our Founding Fathers we are required by law to redraw
legislative boundaries every ten years, after the decennial census. These boundaries create
districts at both the state and federal legislative level, and there are many guidelines which
govern how districts can be drawn in order to provide for fair competition and accurate
representation. Population distribution is key to how electoral districts are drawn at all
levels. In recent decades, increasing concentrated populations of Democrats in urban areas
and decreasing population in rural, more Republican areas has made it harder to draw
competitive districts at the congressional level. There is evidence to support that this
geographic polarization is being driven by citizens themselves, making choices of where
to live based upon their lifestyle and ideology. This concept of self-sorting has been termed
“unintentional gerrymandering” (Chen and Rodden 2013). This trend of “self-sorting” has
been caused by many factors, all of them stemming from a larger movement of generational
change. Intentional gerrymandering, that which is done by powerful incumbent legislators,
is a known problem in political science. Unintentional gerrymandering, the way that
geographic population shifts are affecting legislative and congressional districts in the same
way, is a much less developed and affirmed concept. My research question addresses two
areas that are missing from the current discussion of political geography and redistricting.
The first asks how geographic population distribution (rural vs. urban) affects the amount
of wasted votes in an election cycle, specifically looking at Congressional elections. The
second is to test whether the efficiency gap is an effective formula to measure how wasted
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votes are affected by population shifts within congressional districts between redistricting
cycles.
To do this I examine a sample of urban and rural congressional districts to compare
the number of wasted votes from the 2012 election cycle (which took place after 2010
redistricting was in effect) to the 2018 election cycle (which is the last available election
data before 2020 redistricting will begin).
I find that the number of wasted votes in rural districts in 2012 is significant and
decreases slightly when looking at the 2018 election results. The effect was smaller and
not statistically significant in urban districts when using the 2012 data, but the results in
2018 were much more significant. Supportive of the concept of unintentional
gerrymandering, the population shifts from 2012 to 2018 resulted in more wasted votes in
the districts which I measured.
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1

INTRODUCTION
“We have built a country where everyone can choose the neighborhood most
compatible with his or her lifestyle and beliefs”
-Bill Bishop, The Big Sort

The apportionment of representatives to the states was such a foundational piece of
our government that it is included in the very beginning of the Constitution. In Article 1,
Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States of America, the founders lay out how and
when the census and subsequent apportionment should take place; “The Number of
Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have
at Least one Representative” (U.S. Const. art. I, § 2).
In the defense of the Constitution, the authors of the Federalist Papers, specifically
James Madison, felt it important to address the issue of counting citizens of the new nation
and apportioning representation accordingly; “To the People of the State of New York: The
remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I am to examine, is
grounded on a supposition that the number of members will not be augmented from time
to time, as the progress of population may demand.” (Madison n.d.). We don’t construct
our political arguments quite as eloquently as Madison did here in Federalist Paper No. 58,
nor do we have one Congressional representative for every 30,000 people. One thing that
hasn’t changed is the counting of all people by the federal government every ten years, and
apportioning representatives to the states after that. However, the average size of each
district is approximately 700,000 people, more than twenty-three times what the founders
had written in the Constitution (Burnett 2011).
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The founders intent was for population to be equal between congressional districts.
However, they could not have conceived of and didn’t include, a mechanism to have other
qualifications and guidelines when drawing Congressional districts. Because of this, many
maps are drawn simply on the basis of population size without taking other factors into
account. Since this time there have been additional requirements and guidelines created,
including the need for districts to be compact and contiguous, and additional criteria
regarding racial minorities (Civil Rights Act (1964)). These criteria exist to ensure that
districts are representative of the people who live in them. When these requirements and
guidelines aren’t followed or are bent to give advantage to one party or person over the
other, the result is a district which has been intentionally gerrymandered.
The practice of gerrymandering is as old as the Constitution of the United States
and is one of the most talked-about problems with our political system today. It is often
blamed for everything from partisan gridlock in Congress to uncompetitive elections, and
long-term policy consequences (both nationally and in the states). However, not everyone
agrees that gerrymandering is the culprit for these problems in our political system.
“Despite a lack of direct evidence, partisan gerrymandering has become one of the prime
suspects in the investigation in to what killed moderation and bipartisanship in American
politics” (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2009). Modern American politics are fraught
with increased polarization, uncompetitive elections, and legislative gridlock. Social
scientists and researchers are constantly looking for ways to explain why these things are
happening and recommend possible solutions. One of the most common culprits found
responsible for all of these things is gerrymandering. However, it’s not just
gerrymandering, I’m going to complicate an already messy issue and add an extra adjective
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here; intentional gerrymandering. Intentional gerrymandering refers to a deliberative effort
on the part of those controlling the redistricting process to favor one person, party or group.
What if the cause of America’s political woes (or at least some of them) is not actually
vindictive state legislators, but instead the result of actions of the constituents themselves?
One option is that the culprit is not intentional gerrymandering (at least not by itself), but
something called unintentional gerrymandering.
Gerrymandering often occurs when legislators are responsible for drawing their
own districts. Many state legislative chambers are controlled by Republicans (in recent
redistricting cycles), and there has been a proven tendency for gerrymandering to benefit
that same party (McCarty et. al, 2009). There is strong evidence to suggest that intentional
gerrymandering helped the Republican Party gain congressional seats after the 2010
census; “various analyses have concluded that the Republican Party gained between 20 and
28 seats in the House between 2012 and 2016 due solely to gerrymandering” (Kean, 2018).
The most common type of gerrymandering is intentional, where district maps are
drawn to benefit an incumbent, certain party or racial group (Chen and Rodden, 2013).
Having a large number of wasted votes is usually a sign that a district has been
gerrymandered for partisan advantage. In fact, that is what the Efficiency Gap formula was
originally designed to measure. The efficiency gap was developed by Nicholas
Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee in 2015 as a way to measure extreme partisan
gerrymandering (Veomett, 2018). It’s a simple formula that takes the total number of
wasted votes from the surplus (all votes for the winning candidate, past what was needed
to win) and the losing votes (all votes cast for the losing candidate). What if intentional
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gerrymandering was not the only culprit for increased partisanship and a lack of
competitiveness?
In their piece discussing political geography and electoral bias, Chen and Rodden
introduce the term “unintentional gerrymandering”. They define the term as follows;
“Unintentional gerrymandering, whereby one party’s voters are more geographically
clustered than those of the opposing party due to residential patterns and human
geography” (Chen and Rodden, 2013). This supports Bishop’s (2009) work regarding
self-sorting at the neighborhood level. Chen and Rodden have done the most work
regarding this concept, but more research is needed.
The goal of this research is to determine what effect, if any, shifts in geographic
population distribution has on the amount of wasted votes in Congressional elections. This
research adds to existing research in the field by examining a randomized selection of
congressional districts and comparing the number of wasted votes from the 2012 election
cycle to the 2018 election cycle in rural districts and doing the same in urban districts. It
also tests the efficiency gap standard in a new way, by using it to test for an unintentional
gerrymander, rather than an intentional one.
Given the trends and existing evidence, if a shift in population is causing an effect
on the number of wasted votes, we would expect to see a smaller effect in the 2012 data,
and a larger effect in the 2018 data. In addition, I would expect to find more wasted votes
in both rural and urban congressional districts in 2018 than in 2012. This is because after
reapportionment and redistricting in 2010-2011, the maps in 2012 should be fairly
balanced. Whereas, we would expect there to be a larger imbalance eight years after the
census, from these natural geographic population shifts over time. This would prove that
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the districts start from a fair and balanced place after the census and redistricting and are
moving to be more unbalanced over time, before the lines are redrawn in the following
census.
These expected relationships are only partly confirmed. I find consistent significant
results in the 2012 and 2018 rural data sets and statistically significant results in the 2018
urban data. The results for the 2012 urban data are significant. The effect is larger in the
2018 data when looking at urban districts, but not rural ones.
If intentional gerrymandering causes polarization and/or a lack of competition,
could this also be true for geographic population shifts? We can see from the results that
population shift in both rural and urban districts causes an increase in wasted votes, which
according to the efficiency gap standard is the same problem as gerrymandering. Rural
districts are geographically larger, more politically heterogenous and moderately
Republican (Chen and Rodden, 2013). More wasted votes in rural districts mean that there
is a stronger Republican bias. More wasted votes in urban districts mean the same for
Democrats.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The practice of apportionment following a decennial census is largely
uncontroversial. The Apportionment Act of 1911 set the limit of the House of
Representatives at 435 (History, Art and Archives 2019). This has increased the population
per district since this time, with the average district size after the 2010 census being set at
approximately 700,000 people. After each census, states which have had large gains in
population receive additional seats, taken from states which have diminished in population.
The more contentious part happens after the apportionment, when districts need to be
drawn.
Redistricting is like the much more controversial sister to apportionment.
Redistricting is a power that was left to the states by the Constitution. The vast majority
of states use their state legislatures to draw the new districts, but in recent years there has
been a trend for the responsibility to go to a commission (either independent or politically
appointed). Approximately twenty states have commissions (or a backup commission)
that helps to draw the new maps.
Although they were not explicitly written in to the Constitution, there are many
requirements that legislatures and commissions must take into account when drawing
districts. The first is that the districts within a state must be roughly equal in size. They
must also be compact, contiguous and keep communities of interest (neighborhoods,
minority communities) together (Redistricting Criteria n.d.). The Voting Rights Act also
created redistricting requirements which were aimed at protecting racial minorities
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(History, Art and Archives n.d.). Compactness is also a requirement, but is often at odds
with some of the other thresholds because an odd or ugly district isn’t necessarily a
gerrymander, and in fact might be the best possible district in terms of competitiveness or
representation (Tausanovitch n.d.).
In the 1960s the United States went through what has since been termed a
“Reapportionment Revolution” in which the Supreme Court heard multiple cases related
to redistricting. Many of the requirements related to drawing districts emerged from the
decisions handed down in this time period (Cox and Katz, 2002).
The most controversial element of redistricting is, of course, gerrymandering.
Gerrymandering is as old as the Constitution itself. In 1789, a year after the Constitution
was ratified, Patrick Henry of Virginia used his power as a state legislator to draw a
congressional district which made James Madison compete against James Monroe.
Elbridge Gerry, who was a signatory of the Declaration of Independence and the
Governor of Massachusetts, used his political power to sign an 1812 map into law which
had been so horrendously drawn that it was made to resemble a salamander by a local
journalist. Gerry, who would later become the Fifth Vice President of the United States,
approved (though it should be noted he didn’t draw it) and signed the bill (Trickey,
2017). The term gerrymander has been in Webster’s dictionary since 1864 and has been a
common political practice since then as well (Trickey, 2017). Chief Justice John Roberts
has even spoken publicly about partisan gerrymandering being a problem since the
country began but has withheld the Court from participating judicially in the issue.
“Partisan gerrymandering is nothing new. Nor is frustration with it…The Framers were
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aware of electoral districting problems [and assigned] the issue to the state legislatures.”
(Labunski, 2019). What can be done about the problem of partisan gerrymandering?
The issue of gerrymandering is so well-known and has been so unpopular with the
American public and there is a large, grassroots, reform movement in the United States to
try to tackle the problem. States across the U.S. have seen ballot initiatives, petitions, the
creation of independent commissions, and many, many legal actions against partisan
gerrymandering in recent decades. But can such proposed reforms fix these problems?
We need to fully consider all possible causes, both intentional and unintentional
gerrymandering, before that can be determined. Although intentional, partisan
gerrymandering is often the phenomena focused on when discussing wasted votes in a
district, geographic population shifts are also to blame. We are sorting ourselves
geographically into ideologically like-minded neighborhoods. Partisanship and ideology
have been increasingly overlapping in recent decades, with the term “conservative”
becoming aligned with the Republican party and “liberal” with Democrats (Abramowitz
and Saunders 1998). These “sorted” neighborhoods, make up cities, which make up
counties and are then drawn into ideologically like-minded Congressional districts. Based
on this I would then expect that there would be effects of unintentional gerrymandering
(i.e. we find that population has an effect on wasted votes) in rural areas in every election
cycle, because many districts would have been drawn in favor of Republicans, but urban
areas will show more significant effects in the election cycles that come toward the end
of the decade after population has shifted and clustered in urban areas. I would also
expect to find, based on previous research, that there is a larger overall effect in urban
areas due to the clustering of like-minded voters in densely populated districts.
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In 2019, the Supreme Court all but closed the door on partisan gerrymandering
cases altogether. In a decision handed down from two consolidated cases (Rucho v.
Common Cause, No. 18-422, and Lamone v. Benisek, No. 18-726), Chief Justice John
Roberts wrote in his majority opinion that; “We conclude that partisan gerrymandering
claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts,” (Liptak, 2019).
However, not everyone agreed with Justice Roberts’ opinion. Justice Kagan wrote in her
dissent that; “The practices challenged in these cases imperil our system of government,”
she said. “Part of the court’s role in that system is to defend its foundations. None is more
important than free and fair elections.” (Liptak, 2019). Because of this, state-level
reforms by activists might be the only recourse left to affect positive change in regards to
partisan gerrymandering. The obstacle of justiciability isn’t the only thing facing antigerrymandering activists. Geographic population shifts are another big problem in being
able to draw districts that are conducive to free and fair elections.
The creation of the efficiency gap measure was like an answered prayer for many
activists who were fighting for redistricting reform. It was seen as an answer to Justice
Kennedy’s request for a workable standard to measure partisan gerrymandering (Howe
n.d.). The key to the efficiency gap is looking at wasted votes. The efficiency gap
standard has been used by attorneys and political scientists to quantify and prove partisan
malintent in gerrymandering cases from Wisconsin to North Carolina. As with anything,
the efficiency gap also has its critics. Other researchers and mathematicians have come
up with competing measures and publicly point out the flaws of using this formula to
measure partisan gerrymandering (Bernstein and Duchin, 2017). A main critique is that
it’s too simple and doesn’t get at the complexities of intentional partisan gerrymandering.
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Although it can (and likely will) be used for challenges in the lower courts, the efficiency
gap isn’t living up to its full potential. What if the efficiency gap could be used to
measure wasted votes for other political phenomena?
While an extensive amount of research has been done about intentional
gerrymandering, few studies have focused on unintentional gerrymandering. Concepts
such as population sorting have been studied for other reasons, including the loss of
civic/community life (Putnam, 2000) and homogeneity in populations (Bishop and
Cushing, 2009), but this study looks specifically at the effects of population sorting on
wasted votes in Congressional elections. Many studies look at a more micro level,
looking only at counties in a single state (Kinsella, McTague and Raleigh, 2015) or
neighborhoods (Bishop and Cushing, 2009), or an older time period (Nall, 2015). “The
use of electoral districts to examine cleavages in society is relatively common in the
literature; a large body of work attempts to identify such divisions using partisan voting
and direct democracy voting” (Kinsella et al., 2015). Other scientists have tried to
identify if the concepts displayed in Bishop’s book “hold water” statistically (Abrams and
Fiorina, 2012), this study is another attempt to identify that. All of the research discussed
here fits into the larger field of political geography.
What do I mean by “geographic population shifts”? Specifically that population in
urban areas is growing and population in rural areas is declining. For decades, population
in urban areas has been growing at a sharp rate, while population in rural areas has been
declining. As a result, over half (fifty-three percent) of the U.S. population now resides in
the top fifty urban areas (cities with a million or more people) (Teixeira, 2008).
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How does this correspond to an increase in wasted votes in congressional
elections? In addition to population being sorted into these rural and urban areas, strong
partisanship is associated with each area. Ideologically liberal or those who identify as
Democrats have tended to cluster in urban areas, while those who are ideologically
conservative or identify as Republicans live disproportionately in rural areas. “American
political behavior unquestionably divides along income, religion, gender, race, age, and
geographical fault lines.” (Fisher, 2014). Urban areas are almost always Democratic
voting hot spots. There is a strong relationship between partisan composition and
population density, with a decline in density equating to a decline in Democratic voting
(Teixeira, 2008). By population shifting from rural to urban areas, we are left with likeminded Republican populations in rural areas and Democratic groups in urban areas.
Unlike in the latter half of the 20th century, suburban areas aren’t growing rapidly
(although they remain one of the biggest battleground areas – but that is a story for
another time) (Walter, 2019).
The first half of the 20th century saw population shifts to cities resulting from an
increase in craft production and assembly line labor. In the decades after World War II,
American citizens were increasingly moving to the suburbs (Teixeira, 2008). Even with
population being increasingly concentrated in the suburbs, competitiveness in elections
wasn’t seen as a big problem. Presidential elections (by state) in both 1960 and 1976
were closely contested. “And in both of those elections all of the most populous states
were closely contested including California, New York, Illinois and Texas” (Abramowitz
and Saunders, 1998). In the latter half of the 20th century, geographic population sorting
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took the form of social specialization and increasingly homogenous neighborhoods (in
both urban and rural areas).
The reasons for these large shifts are many and include historical changes,
generational change, increased minority populations, shifting white population, increased
levels of educational attainment and changes in infrastructure (specifically highways).
Generational change, especially the millennial generation, are one of the biggest effects
on shifting population- specifically widening the urban vs. rural divide (Dure, 2014).
Rural areas are suffering from a decreased birth rate because younger generations are
seeking out urban areas for opportunities to live and work.
Millennials, the largest generation, which makes up 30 percent of the voting age
population, differs in many facets of life from previous generations (Fry, 2018). Along
with this generational change has come a shift in traditional gender roles. From 1972
until today; “the proportion of married couples that both work outside the home has risen
from 32 to 52 percent.” (Teixeira, 2008). In conjunction with being more populous in
urban areas, millennial and unmarried voters are more likely to be Democratic voters
(Teixeira, 2008).
Generational change is also tied closely to another factor which is affecting
population shift, increased immigrant populations (Teixeira, 2008). It is evident from exit
polling and census data that the share of minority populations making up the electorate
(especially the 18-45 age group) is continuing to grow. According to exit polling from the
2008 election “African-Americans made up 15 percent of voters under the age of 45.
Hispanics and other nonwhites made up 19 percent of voters under the age of 45
compared” (Abramowitz, 2010). Black, Asian and Hispanic minority groups are all
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strong Democratic voting blocs. This is supported by looking at demographics of eligible
votes in blue and red states. “Eligible voters in solid blue states are 34 percent minority,
while in solid red states they are 26 percent minority” (Teixeira 2008). Although minority
populations are on the rise, it is the pattern in where people are living that is changing and
becoming more alike. The country as a whole is becoming more diverse, but
neighborhoods are more homogenous.
One of the consequences, as evidenced through the measure of wasted votes, is
electoral competitiveness. In 2000 the vote margin between candidates George W. Bush
and Al Gore in Florida was 0.00921%. 527 votes separated the two, with the winner
becoming President of the United States (Blomquist, 2000). Decades prior in 1974, a
Senate race in New Hampshire had a vote margin of 0.000901%, with only 2 wasted
votes. Only five congressional elections (House and Senate) have had a less than 1% vote
margin since 2000.
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Table 1

U.S. Congressional Districts with a less than 1% vote margin from
2000-2018.
Total Votes Cast (for

Year
2000

District
Washington

Margin

Margin Votes

Winner)

0.09301%

2229

1,199,437

0.07403%

121

81,789

0.0342%

83

121,248

0.01287%

312

1,212,629

0.07343%

161

109,704

Senate
2002

Colorado 7th
CD

2006

Connecticut
2nd CD

2008

Minnesota
Senate

2014

Arizona 2nd
CD

These low-margin elections demonstrate a high level of electoral competition. “In
the competitive 1960 and 1976 elections, for example, there were far more closely
contested states and far fewer landslide states than in recent presidential elections”
(Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998). In addition to having large margins of wasted votes
many of these elections are won by incumbents. A startling statistic; “99% of incumbents
standing for reelection were successful in the 2002 and 2004 elections.” (McCarty et al.
2009). A consequence of geographic polarization is that there are far more landslide
states now than there were decades ago. This is true for presidential as well as
congressional elections. Anyone who looks at a blue and red map of presidential election
results can see that there are partisan groups of voters, clustered together around the
country. It’s why the map looks red in the middle and blue on the outskirts.
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Bill Bishop focused his research in The Big Sort on the question of why this
geographic polarization was happening and the factors that are causing it to worsen. His
explanation? A phenomenal he entitled The Big Sort. Bishop’s argument is that
Americans are sorting not just along racial, economic or religious divides, but a larger allencompassing ideological divide. He suggests that all of these other demographic factors
feed into this ideological separation, this “Big Sort”. This sorting is driven by two main
factors; “one is the growth of “a politics of self-expression,” where partisan divisions in
the public are increasingly driven by social, cultural, and consumer identities (Bishop
2009). The second is “the geographic dimensions of this division have been fueled by
economic mobilization” (Bishop and Cushing 85). These factors came together to create
a situation in which we choose to live among those who are ideologically like-minded
and aligned on a partisan basis. “We have built a country where everyone can choose the
neighborhood most compatible with his or her lifestyle and beliefs” (Bishop and Cushing
40). This is a common phenomenon that has been studied in other disciplines besides
political science. “Sociologists and psychologists refer to the clustering of people with
like-mindedness and/or similar backgrounds (sorting) as homophily, or simply that “like
attracts like” (Kinsella et al. 2015). Lifestyle preference is the largest factor of this, but
this lifestyle preference is only achievable through the causes of population shifts that
have been mentioned previously (generational change, educational attainment, change in
traditional gender roles, etc). To measure how Americans are living in ideologically likeminded areas, Bishop uses presidential election return data. “Americans are increasingly
living in communities and neighborhoods whose residents share their values and they are
increasingly voting for candidates who reflect those values.” (Bishop and Cushing, 2009).
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Although I use Bishop’s book, The Big Sort, to inform and support much of the
basis for my argument, I don’t endorse whether his stance on neighborhood sorting is
making us more or less polarized, but rather conclude that sorting is indeed a
phenomenon that is occurring in congressional districts (including multiple
neighborhoods and cities and in some instances, multiple counties) and that its effect is
evident in declining congressional election competitiveness. For this specific research,
I’m less concerned with the problem of political discourse and more concerned with the
aggregated voting behavior and possible implications.
The main consequence of the sorting Bishop describes is that people who live in
like-minded neighborhoods and communities won’t encounter disagreement or differing
points of view through conversation with their neighbors (Bishop and Cushing, 2009).
One of the biggest criticisms of intentions behind The Big Sort focuses on this point. The
most noted, vocal, critics of Bishop’s work are Samuel Abrams and Morris Fiorina
(2012). Their criticisms are largely based around the claims that the geographic
population sorting affects, and is affected by, a lack of interaction and conversation
between neighbors. Although they take issue with the listed consequences (and some of
the empirical methods) of The Big Sort, Abrams and Fiorina do not disagree with the
outcome or concerns these findings hold for democracy. “We agree that such behavior is
highly problematic for democratic politics, and if realized, a matter of serious concern.”
(Abrams and Fiorina, 2012). The biggest critique of Bishop’s methods are that
presidential election return data is limiting and doesn’t give the whole picture. This could
also be a critique of the research here, and an idea that will be explored more later on is
the need for data at a more localized level to really get at the idea of residential
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polarization. I take issue with Abrams and Fiorina’s critique. Insinuating that geographic
population sorting by ideology can only have a strong effect if neighbors are having inperson political conversations, is ignoring the effect it can have on electoral
competitiveness, the redistricting process and all other issues discussed herein. There is
strong research to support the claims that Bishop makes. McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal
have done work in this field and have found that geographic polarization has grown along
with Congressional polarization and other modern problems including income inequality
(Nall, 2015, McCarty et al., 2006).
Chen and Rodden, the creators of the term “unintentional gerrymandering” find
through their research that; “the highest levels of electoral bias against Democrats occur
in states where Democratic voters are most concentrated in urban areas” (Chen and
Rodden, 2013). And we see this bias in everything from presidential and congressional
elections, to state legislative elections as well. In recent decades, the more rural parts of
the South and West have become solidly Republican, while the Northeast and West Coast
have become strongly Democratic in voting behavior (Hopkins, 2010).
As discussed previously, gerrymandering has been a problem since shortly after
the Constitution was ratified in 1788. Racial gerrymandering was a large problem in the
Civil Rights era and partisan gerrymandering has been a problem in recent decades.
Geographic population shifts are creating a similar problem, sorting like-minded or
demographically similar people into one area, but this problem is endogenous and
discussed much less. One way to measure partisan gerrymandering is the efficiency gap,
which looks at how many wasted votes were cast in an election. Using this measure, a
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district where more than eight percent of votes are wasted is considered to be
gerrymandered.
The efficiency gap is a straightforward equation that was created to fulfill Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s request for a manageable standard by which to evaluate partisan
gerrymandering claims in the courts. There are two kinds of wasted votes; losing and
surplus (Veomett, 2018). The losing vote refers to all votes cast for the losing
candidate(s). The surplus vote refers to all votes for the winning candidate past the fiftyplus-one needed to win. “From a party’s point of view, a vote is wasted in one of two
cases. Democrats who vote in districts that lean heavily Republican are wasting votes,
since they’re supporting losing candidates. But Democrats who vote in heavily
Democratic districts are also wasting votes, since every vote beyond the one that clinches
the majority doesn’t contribute to the victory” (Kean, 2018). Of course, in real life, no
districting plan will have an efficiency gap of exactly 0. So, how high is too high?
Stephanopoulos and McGhee argue that corresponds to a historically robust threshold for
unacceptable partisan gerrymandering (Bernstein and Duchin, 2017). The efficiency gap
judges that a district is gerrymandered if the wasted vote percentage is higher than eight
percent. In a two-party system like the United States, bias emerges when one party has a
more concentrated amount of voters in one district (Chen and Rodden, 2013). Having a
large number of wasted votes means that the district is biased to be more responsive to
one party over another. This could be the case if the district was gerrymandered but if it
was drawn fairly the percentage of wasted votes should be below eight percent, according
to the efficiency gap’s creators- Nicholas Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee (Veomett,
2018).
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In a study looking at Wisconsin’s State Assembly, Krasno, Magleby, McDonald,
Donahue, and Best, find; “Further investigation reveals important measurement
characteristics of the efficiency gap that renders it a dubious metric with which to detect
and weigh gerrymanders for the results it yields may vary widely depending on the
election used and overall competitiveness of the state” (Krasno et al., 2018). Even critics
don’t dismiss it entirely, but it can’t be used as a standalone method to measure
gerrymandering (Kean, 2018). This will be discussed in more detail in the “future
research” section later.
To address my second research question, I attempt to determine if the efficiency
gap can be used to measure wasted votes caused by unintentional gerrymandering. I
expect that the efficiency gap can be used to measure the effect of population shifts on
wasted votes. I also expect that there will be a larger effect the farther away in time from
when redistricting took effect. This is a new use for the measure, which has not been
tested before. If the proper control variables are used, the efficiency gap should work to
measure the effect of population shifts on wasted votes. Establishing an alternate use for
the efficiency gap could be the baseline for future avenues of work which use the
efficiency gap to measure other concepts besides partisan gerrymandering.
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METHODS
What effect does this demonstrated geographic population shift have on the
amount of wasted votes in an election? I will use the efficiency gap to measure how
wasted votes are affected by population shifts within congressional districts between
redistricting cycles. For this research I focus specifically on rural and urban congressional
districts. I also use a time series analysis to compare the 2012 election cycle to the 2018
election cycle, with the expectation that there will be a larger effect on wasted votes in
2018 due to shifting population over time, before redistricting occurs again at the end of
the decade.
There was no existing data set which contained the information I needed, within
the parameters of my research design. I therefore created a data set from scratch. Using
an interactive map of the 2017 American Community Survey (ACS) data I compiled
population and area (square mile) for every congressional district, and then calculated
population per square mile. That list was separated into four quartiles based on the
calculation of people per square mile1. The first and second quartiles contained the most
rural districts. Quartile three was suburban and quartile four contained all of the urban
districts.

1

After completing the list, but before separating into quartiles, I removed the congressional
districts which were not applicable to this research. Those are as follows; American Samoa,
Guam, Northern Mariana Island, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
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Defining “rural” was challenging as definitions at the federal level vary across
agencies. I reviewed fifteen different definitions of rural before choosing to use the
Department of Veteran’s Affairs definition. This measure was chosen because, of the
federal definitions I was able to find, it was one of only two that used the calculation of
people per square mile to define the category. I also used the Veteran’s Affairs definition
of “urban” which is; areas that have “a density above 1,000 people per square mile” (The
Washington Post, 2013).
I chose to create my own quartiles for this research as most available data
regarding urban and rural areas are done at the county level, but because congressional
districts cross county lines I was unable to use existing data. Suburban districts have been
removed from this data 2 because my research question purposefully excludes suburban
areas. The scope of this research is focused solely on urban and rural districts, mainly to
show a comparison of the Democratic and Republican bias that exists in each, but also
because including suburban districts complicated the intent. There is research suggesting
that suburbs are now the most competitive regions in the country, which is interesting but
unfortunately falls outside the scope of this research (Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2002). A
research design including (or focused on) suburban districts would require its own
research design to fully control for all effects.
After removing those districts which were classified as suburban, the rural and
urban districts were then separated into two separate sheets. Because this data sheet was
created in Microsoft Excel, I used an excel formula (random_number) to assign random

The definition I selected did not strictly account for a definition of suburban, so I
designated those districts with 500-1,000 people per square mile as being suburban.
2
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numbers to all remaining districts. I then sorted these random numbers from smallest to
largest and chose the first thirty districts in each sheet (rural and urban)3. Creating a
random sample of districts is important to the implications of the findings of this
research. We can more likely generalize and apply the findings if the sample is
completely random.
The final rural data set contained twenty-seven observations and the urban data
set contained thirty-one. The sample size of the rural data set ended up being smaller than
the urban data set because some districts needed to be removed4. Some states are only
apportioned one representative, the minimum amount guaranteed by the Constitution, and
these districts are considered “at-large”. A few at-large districts were included in the
random sample of rural districts selected for this research but were removed because the
control variable used to look at gerrymandering in a given state didn’t apply. This design
uses a small sample because of the scope of the design was built around having a random
sample. Because the sample was selected randomly from a larger pool of all 435
congressional districts, we can safely assume that the effects shown are representative of
both rural and urban districts throughout the country.

3

Although the districts were chosen completely randomly, the urban data set includes
districts of notable Democrats including Adam Schiff (CA 28), Nancy Pelosi (CA 12),
Ilhan Omar (MN 5) and Rashida Tlaib (MI 13).
4
North Carolina 9 was originally included in the rural data set, but in February of 2019 the
North Carolina State Board of Elections ordered a new election in this Congressional
District. Because the election return data for 2018 was considered invalid I removed this
district from the sample.
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The dependent variable for these models is wasted votes, which was calculated
using the efficiency gap formula. The use of this was designed to test whether the
formula could be used to measure other concepts in political science, in addition to the
concept of partisan gerrymandering which it was designed to measure. The efficiency gap
formula is as follows:

Efficiency Gap = (Total Democratic Wasted Votes – Total Republican Wasted
Votes) ÷ Total Votes

(source: The Brennan Center)

As explained previously, the Efficiency Gap is used to measure wasted votes. Table 2
below shows an example of the amount of wasted votes cast each in a rural (Kentucky 2)
and urban district (California 13) across the two election cycles studied.

Table 2

Examples of wasted vote calculation between two districts.
Wasted
Votes
Party #1

Wasted
Votes
Party #2

Kentucky 2 141134.5 40,374

Total Wasted
Votes 2012

Wasted
Votes Party
#1

Wasted
Total
Votes Party Wasted
#2
Votes
2018

129,915

128673.5

43,027

122,991

144,290

147419.5

113,161

147,418

(RURAL)

California
13
(URBAN)

144292

106,144
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The main independent variable is the total population of each congressional
district. It is important to note that I use population as a whole, and not voting eligible
population, voting age population or the population of registered voters.
Controlling for incumbency is important as incumbency can have an effect on the
outcome of elections, a phenomenon known as the incumbency advantage, though the
strength of the incumbency advantage has decreased in recent years and is debated
among some scholars (Landsman, 2017). There can also be an electoral effect when an
incumbent chooses not to run again. This can be attributed to the sentiment towards an
incumbent’s party being negative, which would create a natural decline in the vote share
for that party (Cox and Katz, 2002). In the data set, I controlled for incumbency by
recording 1, if an incumbent won in that district in that election cycle, and 0 if other (i.e.
an incumbent ran but lost or an incumbent did not run).
To account for the partisan lean in a given district, I also included the Cook
Political Report’s Partisan Voter Index score in the models. This measure is used as a
proxy for previous vote margin, which was either unavailable or difficult to include for
all districts. Districts which were Democratic leaning were given positive scores, while
Republican leaning districts were given negative scores to create an ordinal variable. For
the 2018 data, I used the 2017 Cook Political Report, which covers the 115th Congress
and includes results from the 2016 election. I paired the 2012 data with the report
covering the 113th Congress. This incorporates data from the 2004 and 2008 presidential
election results.
The next control variable was an attempt to control for turnout. To do this I
looked at other races on the ballot and used gubernatorial elections as a proxy for other
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races which might have influenced turnout in each cycle. To create this measure, I looked
at whether a gubernatorial race was on the ballot for each state in each election. This was
converted into a binary variable with 1 = yes and 0 = no.
The next control variable included aims to assess whether a state’s congressional
districts were gerrymandered. It is important to control for intentional gerrymandering
here so that we can attempt to isolate the effects of unintentional gerrymandering. To do
this I include the Polsby-Popper measure of compactness for each state. Although there
are multiple measures which can indicate whether a district has been gerrymandered, the
Polsby-Popper measure was the most popular measure in the research I cite. This
measure is actually a ratio which measures the area of the Congressional district
compared to the area of a circle, the circumference of which is equal to the perimeter of
the district. In the Polsby-Popper measure, a high ratio indicates that a state is less
gerrymandered, while a low ratio indicates that a state is more gerrymandered. The basic
idea is that the district should be able to fit inside a circle with the same perimeter, if it
cannot do this it is less compact (having a low ratio) and thus more likely to be a
gerrymander. The biggest criticism of this measure is that it does not take state and
natural boundaries into account. This could give a false ratio/score for districts which
geographically are less compact owing to the physical landscape of the district.
Alternative measures which could be used in a future model include; the Schwartzberg,
Area/Convex Hull and Reock ratio, all of which are similar and measure area and
compactness.
Party control is a binary variable indicating if a party other than the Republican or
Democratic Party was the second highest vote getter in a given election. In almost all the
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districts in the sample, Democrats and Republicans constituted the first and second
highest vote getters. In elections where this was not the case, a notation was made in the
data set. For a full list of these exceptions please see Appendix A.
The final variable is included to account for racial makeup of the districts. I use
American Community Survey data which includes the percent of Non-Hispanic White
population in each district. Although there are various limitations with all of these
measures, together they ultimately provide a strong picture of the effect of unintentional
gerrymandering.
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RESULTS
Table 3 shows the results of a linear regression model of the 2012 data for the
rural congressional districts. The coefficient for the population variable is 0.412. This is a
significant result, telling us that for every additional 2.4 people in a district, there is an
additional wasted vote in a given district. The p-value, at 0.019, is also statistically
significant. I’m confident (98.1%) with that p-value that the results displayed here are
statistically different from zero. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis and safely
assume that there is an effect between population shifts and wasted votes in congressional
elections. Specifically, there is an increase of one wasted vote for a growth of two and a
half people in a district. As population increases, so does the amount of wasted votes. The
variable of “Race” is a key control variable, as racial makeup is key to mapmakers when
drawing districts, especially under the Voting Rights Act.
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Table 3

Comparison of 2012 and 2018 Elections Results for Rural
Congressional Districts

Variables
Population
Incumbent Won
Partisan Voter Index
Gubernatorial Race
Gerrymander (by
state)

2012 Election
Results

2018 Election
Results

0.4127977
(0.019)**
2090.079
(0.873)
1116.838
(0.023)
842.0291
(0.941)
-1408.119
(.036)

.253
(0.021)**
16942.07
(0.268)
-339.1169
(0.492)
19335
(0.143)
-717.2987
(0.320)

7003.946
(0.691)
614.923
(.055)*

-23654.75
(0.210)
635.9966
(.087)*

0.4987
27

0.4024
27

Party Control
Race

R-squared
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

It is worth noting that the rural districts in this sample are largely conservative,
which is consistent with other research and knowledge about voting patterns in rural
areas. The Republican candidate won in twenty-three of the twenty-eight districts in the
2012 election cycle. This is consistent with expecting some Republican bias, as existing
literature would support, in the redistricting cycle that occurred in 2010.
The coefficient for population in the 2018 election model is .253, which is lower
than the coefficient for the model using 2012 data. As we would expect, this is a
significant result, telling us that for every additional four people in a district, there is an
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additional wasted vote in a given district. The p-value, at 0.021, is also statistically
significant. I’m confident (97.9%) with that p-value that the results are statistically
different from zero5. Consistent with the 2012 results, we find further support that there is
a relationship between population shifts and wasted votes in congressional elections. As
population increases, so does the number of wasted votes.
Just like in the 2012 cycle, the Republican candidate also won in twenty-three out
of the twenty-eight districts in the 2018 election cycle. Population is declining in rural
areas, which is evident when comparing the 2012 results to the 2018 results in the Table
3. In 2012 it took only 2.5 people to produce one wasted vote, where in the same districts
in 2018 it took four people to create the same effect.

5

The P-value is higher than in the 2012 results, it still meets the 95% threshold needed.
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Table 4

Comparison of 2012 and 2018 Elections Results for Urban
Congressional Districts
2012 Election
Variables

Results

Population
Incumbent Won
Partisan Voter Index
Gubernatorial Race

Gerrymander
Party Control
Race

R-squared
Observations

2018 Election
Results

0.28502
(0.280)
52905.95
(0.123)
-1121.285
(0.172)
-619.5982
(0.985)
133.4207
(0.930)

.324
(0.000)***
-7403.065
(0.448)
925.1055
(0.029)
19514.87
(0.042)
-873.1986
(0.176)

32979.47
(0.319)
676.6433
(0.273)

18358.16
(0.210)
1124.486
(0.000)***

0.2582
31

0.6361
31

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4 presents the results of the linear regression models for the urban districts.
Like the previous models, the dependent variable is wasted votes. The coefficient for
population is .285 in the 2012 election. As population increases by 3.5 people, there is an
additional wasted vote in a given district. However, this is not a statistically significant
result (p=0.280), so we cannot be confident in the value of the coefficient. This effect is
also less significant than the effect found in the model for rural data in 2012. This is
notable because it shows that there was less of an effect from wasted votes after
redistricting took place in 2011. Consistent with the geographic population trends
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discussed previously, the Democratic candidate won twenty-six out of the thirty-one
races in the 2012 election cycle.
The coefficient for population increases to .324 in the 2018 election. A population
increase of 3 people in any given district would thus predict an additional wasted vote.
The p-value, at 0.000, is statistically significant. We can be confident with that p-value
that the results displayed here are statistically different from zero and thus are significant.
We can therefore reject the null hypothesis and safely assume that there is a relationship
between population shifts and wasted votes in congressional elections in urban districts
for the 2018 election cycle. In 2018, thirty of the thirty districts were won by the
Democratic candidate, which is why it is important to control for party in the models
above.
Consistent with the overall findings, the variable for race was significant in the
rural data sets in both election cycles, but only significant in the urban data in 2018.
Thus, there is a strong correlation between the percentage of the population which is
white and the number of wasted votes in an election cycle. Because the population shift
has increased the population in urban areas it was consistent with my expected findings to
have a more significant effect in 2018. However, it was surprising that the results in 2012
were not statistically significant (even for a small effect). When considering the rural
districts, the effect in 2012 was larger than the effect in 2018. This is likely because the
districts were drawn to Republican advantage after the 2010 Census and redistricting
cycle, and because population shifted away from rural areas in the time between election
cycles. Thus, it takes fewer people to create more wasted votes in 2012 and more people
to create the same wasted vote in 2018, prior to the new census and redistricting cycle
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taking place. To be absolutely sure of this result we should replicate the model using
2020 data when available. However, using the existing data one can see that the results in
the models above are statistically significant so we can be sure that there is an effect of
population shifts on wasted votes in rural Congressional districts. These results support
the idea that there is geographic polarization happening across districts in between
redistricting cycles. The effects of population on wasted votes were significant in 2018
for urban districts and not in 2012, and, given that redistricting didn’t occur in this time,
this is suggestive that these results could be due to geographic polarization.
However we know that based on these results, we can see that in 2018 in rural
districts it would take about four people to create an additional wasted vote, vs the three
that it would take to create the same wasted vote in an urban district. This tells us that
there is a positive effect of population changes on wasted votes in both rural and urban
congressional districts, but that this effect is larger in rural areas. Just like intentional
gerrymandering, unintentional gerrymandering also has a bias for Republicans. Large
population shifts between 2012 and 2018 contributed to more wasted votes. Given the
small sample it is impressive that the results were statistically significant, the
implications of this significance will be discussed further in the following section.
Before discussing the content and context of these results and the implications,
which arise from them, it is important to note that the second research question was tested
and answered here. The Efficiency Gap formula is effective in not only calculating the
number of wasted votes in each district, but as a part of these models it gives us
statistically significant results when looking at the effect of population shifts on wasted
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votes. Although it will undoubtedly still have critics, it can and should be used as a
variable in other scientific research within the field of Political Science in the future.
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DISCUSSION
My research questions address two areas that are missing from the current
discussion of political geography and redistricting. The first, is whether the efficiency gap
is an effective formula to measure how wasted votes are increased by population shifts
within congressional districts between redistricting cycles. The second, is to examine the
effect of geographic population distribution (rural vs. urban) on the amount of wasted votes
in an election cycle. I find that population shifts have a significant effect on wasted votes
in rural districts in both the 2012 and 2018 election cycles, and in the urban districts in the
2018 election cycle. The effect is larger in the urban district than the rural district when
comparing significant results from the 2018 data.
This research adds to existing research in the field by examining a randomized
selection of congressional districts and comparing the number of wasted votes in rural
districts to that in urban districts. It is a meaningful test of the efficiency gap standard to
measure something besides intentional, partisan gerrymanders. It adds data to the field of
political geography and gives a good baseline to be able to expand a similar research
design to incorporate additional time periods (both past and future). It also supports the
research done by Bill Bishop and Robert Cushing in The Big Sort (Bishop and Cushing,
2009). The increase in wasted votes connected to population in three of the four models,
in addition to the high percentage of a single party consistently winning election in the
districts from our random sample, are further evidence of geographic population shifts
exhibiting a self-sorting pattern in America. Comparing the 2012 results to the results
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from 2018, we see that there was a larger effect in the rural congressional districts,
indicating that these districts were drawn biased in favor of Republicans. Likewise we
can interpret the results of the 2012 election cycle for the urban districts to show that
there was no effect in 2012, the effects were statistically significant, and that these
districts were drawn more fairly, without bias. The results in 2018, however, show that
population has a large effect on wasted votes. The effects seen here are impressive,
especially given the small sample size used. This adds strength to the case that
geographic polarization and sorting is happening at a significant level, and that the results
here could be generalized and applied to all districts.
In finding support for the theory that population shifts have an effect on wasted
votes, we have to consider the difficult question of what comes next. How do we create a
solution to the problem of unintentional gerrymandering? The grassroots reform
movements among the states might not be the proper solution to this new problem. One
idea, an idea that would be a major change from the current American electoral system, is
to introduce new requirements for redistricting and to possibly remove or alter older ones.
Future research should help to inform possible solutions.
Representation is the key to democracy in the United States, specifically
representation which is driven by geographic distribution of voters across legislative
districts (Chen and Rodden 2013). For districts in which the percentage of votes
unequally translates into seats, or districts in which a large number of wasted votes occur
this creates a problem of bias. “Studies of electoral bias typically flow from the
normative premise that in a two-party system, a party with 50% of the votes should
receive 50% of the seats.” (Chen and Rodden, 2013).
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Although I generally find support for the findings discussed here, it is important
to acknowledge the limitation of methods. There are potential critiques of almost every
measure included in the models, including, but not limited to: the efficiency gap, PolsbyPopper and partisan voting index.
Although it was outside the scope of this research, looking at population flows
from rural counties to urban counties between states would be an ideal way to expand
upon this research and further identify how geographic population shifts can have an
effect on wasted votes. This would help us identify not just how urban areas have grown
and rural areas have shrunk in overall population, but also how people are moving from
rural areas to urban ones and tie this to ideology, partisan and/or lifestyle choices.
I also worked on a limited time series, studying two election cycles within one
period of redistricting. Future studies should also expand the time series part of this data,
going farther back in time and into the future to gather more electoral cycle data over
time. This will help substantiate the claims made herein and be able to expand upon the
effects of redistricting.
Another idea for future research, one which came up as a critique from multiple
other researchers, was the idea that data at the presidential or congressional level is too
high level to truly identify the problem. For this reason, replicating the study with data on
a smaller scale could help to support and diversify how these findings can be generalized.
“Few studies tackle electoral analysis at a micro-scale due to both methodological
difficulties associated with data collection and frequent precinct boundary changes.”
(Kinsella et al. 2015). Finally, increasing the sample size by either taking a bigger
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sample, say fifty congressional districts instead of thirty would help to further support the
validity of these findings.
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CONCLUSION
Narratives, like those which occurred in Florida and New Mexico in the Presidential
election of 2000 might be a thing of the past. Americans are sorting themselves into
ideologically homogenous geographic clusters – which limits how redistricting can work
in our electoral process. Some of the biggest unanswered questions in this field are; If
liberal Democrats move to urban areas and those who identify as conservative Republicans
stay in rural ones, how can we ever draw a balanced and competitive map? How do we
ensure that representation is fair and equal?
If voters who identify as Democrats continue to cluster and homogenize into
urban areas, they will create a long-term disadvantage for the Democratic party- based on
the way our electoral system currently functions. “Traditional districting principles of
contiguity and compactness will generate substantial electoral bias in favor of the
Republican Party”(Chen and Rodden, 2013). Even in the absence of racial and partisan
gerrymandering, there is a clear effect of population shifts increasing wasted votes in
both rural and urban areas. This is the same effect as what we see from intentional
gerrymandering, a larger amount of wasted votes. Ultimately, because of this geographic
clustering it will be even more difficult to draw a random, representative map.
Past scholars have taken sharp positions in favor (Carson, Crespin, Finocchiaro and
Rohde, 2007) and against (Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning, 2006; McCarty et al.,
2009) the hypothesis that gerrymandering affects polarization in the House of
Representatives, and scholars have also examined the impact of gerrymandering on the
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incumbency advantage (Friedman and Holden, 2009). Other studies have analyzed the
effect of racial gerrymandering and the relationship it may have to existing electoral bias
(Chen and Rodden, 2013). The efficiency gap measure may only be a starting place in the
journey to measure the effects of partisan gerrymandering (both intentional and
unintentional). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court ruled in early 2019 that they would not
rule on future partisan gerrymandering cases.
The implications of this research are varied and unfortunately, incomplete. We
can always do more, examine on a broader level and dive farther back to offer more
support. But from the results we can see that population shifts do have an effect. The
biggest takeaway from this research is that we need to spend time measuring,
investigating and studying the effects of unintentional gerrymandering with the same
focus and intensity that we use to understand and combat intentional gerrymandering.
Controlling for intentional gerrymandering within a state allows us to see the effect that
change in population between 2012 and 2018 has on the amount of wasted votes in an
election.
The results of this research suggest that the problem may be more complicated than
what current redistricting reforms are trying to solve. Unfortunately, in some areas, this
geographic, unintentional gerrymandering might be too severe for independent
commissions and other proposed redistricting reforms to have much of an impact. Existing
reforms are based on the assumption that corrupt politicians are drawing the district lines
solely for partisan advantage, and that human geography plays no significant role in
generating electoral bias. If Democrats move to urban areas and Republicans stay in rural
ones, how can we ever draw a balanced map?
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One possible solution to this problem which is worth exploring further, is to
change, at the federal level, the requirements for drawing districts. A more extreme
solution would be to make changes to the American electoral system, making it more
proportional. One proposal for proportional representation is to create multimember
House districts with ranked choice voting (Yglesisas, 2018).
While there are not concrete solutions to these problems, in fact more questions
than answers have been generated from this research, the results discussed here give us a
good baseline to know that there is an effect of population shifts on wasted votes and that
it is something we should continue to measure with new data generated from past
elections but also in upcoming elections (2020) and after the next round of redistricting
(2021) from the new census. Similar to intentional partisan gerrymandering, this might
not be a completely solvable problem, but rather something American voters understand
as a constant challenge to our democratic processes and something we can spread
awareness of, and then work to fix where and how we can.
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APPENDIX A
Races in which a candidate belonging to a third party (not Democrat or Republican)
was the first or second highest vote-getter.
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Table 5

Data Set: Rural 2018
State

District

Vote Share

Party

California

2

42,044

No Party

Georgia

8

564

Write-In

Massachusetts

1

58,166

Blank
Votes

Table 6

Data Set: Rural 2012
State

District

Vote

Party

0

No votes

Share
Georgia

8

were recorded for
any other party.
Massachusetts

1

70, 422

Blank/Void

Texas

19

28,824

Libertarian
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Table 7

Data Set: Urban 2018
State

District

Vote Share

Party

California

13

34,257

Green
Party

Massachusetts

7

28,966

Blank
Votes

New York

16

42, 982

Blank
Votes

Table 8

Data Set: Urban 2012
State

District

Vote

Party

38, 146

No Party

Share
California

13

Preference
Massachusetts

7

41,199

Independent

New York

7

29, 692

Blank/Void

New York

13

40, 718

Blank/Void

